U.S. Tariff Update from NASCO Network

Tuesday, August 5, 2025

Key changes for Canada:

U.S. Tariff Update from NASCO Network

Wednesday, April 30, 2025, 5:37 p.m.

White House Amends Automobile Parts Tariffs to Ease Burden on U.S. Automakers

On April 29, 2025, President Trump signed a Proclamation amending the previously announced tariffs on automobile parts used in passenger vehicles and light trucks. This amendment follows Proclamation 10908, which announced 25% section 232 tariffs on imports of certain final, assembled passenger vehicles and light trucks (“automobiles”), effective April 3, 2025, and imports of certain automobile parts, set to take effect on May 3, 2025. All in-scope passenger vehicles and light trucks (including SUVs and other types of passenger vehicles) and automobile parts are listed in Annex I of Proclamation 10908.  Key automobile parts listed in Annex I of Proclamation 10908 include engines, engine parts, transmissions and powertrain parts, and certain electrical components.

Import Adjustment Offset for Automobile Parts used in the Final Assembly of Passenger Vehicles and Light Trucks in the United States

The Proclamation provides that automobile producers (i.e., OEMs) that perform final assembly of passenger vehicles and light trucks in the United States will be eligible for an “import adjustment offset” amount applicable to section 232 duties for automobile parts. Specifically, these credits will be available to OEMs in an amount equal to 3.75 percent of the aggregate Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) value of all in-scope automobiles assembled in the United States by that automobile producer from April 3, 2025, through April 30, 2026. For automobiles assembled in the United States between May 1, 2026, through April 30, 2027, OEMs will be eligible to receive 2.5 percent of the aggregate MSRP value. These percentages reflect the total duty that would be owed when a 25 percent duty is applied to parts accounting 15% (2025-26) and 10% 2026-27) of the automobile’s MSRP value, respectively.

These percentages derive from the Trump Administration’s consultations with the automobile manufacturers that the highest level of U.S. content, including engineering and research and development, in automobiles assembled in the United States is 85% at present (with an aspirational target of 90% in 2026-27).  The  White House Fact Sheet  that accompanied the Proclamation indicates that the Trump Administration has determined that of the 8 million automobiles assembled in the United States in 2024, the average domestic content was 50% and likely closer to 40%. According to the Administration, the import adjustment offset “will more quickly reduce reliance on foreign manufacturing and importation of automobiles and automobile parts; strengthen United States vehicle assembly operations by encouraging companies to expand domestic production capacity, which is critical to a strong domestic defense industrial base; shift manufacturing activity into the United States; increase domestic automotive research and development so that American-owned producers can produce cutting-edge technologies that are essential to the United States defense industrial base and our military superiority; create jobs in the automotive industry that increase the number of employees in the domestic automotive industry; and ensure that other benefits of production are concentrated in the United States.”

The import adjustment offset amounts will be available only to automobiles that undergo final assembly in the United States. The import adjustment offset amount may only be used by importers of record authorized by the automobile manufacturer, including the suppliers of the parts eligible for such offset amount. Specifically, a “manufacturer with an approved import adjustment offset amount may determine the importers of record eligible to decrement against that manufacturer’s import adjustment offset amount, and that list of importers of record may include suppliers in that manufacturer’s supply chain for automobiles assembled in the United States if the manufacturer so chooses.” As a result, the OEM ultimately decides which suppliers, if any, will be able to use that OEM’s import adjustment to offset the Section 232 25% automotive parts tariffs that will enter into force on May 3, 2025. The import adjustment offset amount, however, should not exceed the total amount attributable to the manufacturer’s total parts tariff liability.

On or before May 29, 2025, the Department of Commerce will establish a process by which manufacturers can submit the following information to obtain import adjustment offset:

  1. Projected U.S. vehicle production volumes and final assembly plant locations;
  2. Estimated tariff costs under Proclamation 10908, including direct and supplier-incurred amounts;
  3. The total import offset amount requested, per the schedule set by the Secretary of Commerce;
  4. A breakdown of importers of record authorized to use the offset, with corresponding importer of record numbers and allocations;
  5. A signed certification from a senior officer affirming the accuracy and completeness of the information, based on reasonable due diligence.

Once a manufacturer’s submission is verified and deemed eligible, the Secretary of Commerce will approve the application and notify U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with the necessary details—including importer of record numbers and approved offset amounts. CBP will apply the offset to the approved importers using its standard procedures, such as reducing tariff obligations at the time of entry or through other lawful means. Should an importer claim an offset amount that exceeds the amount approved by the Department of Commerce for a particular manufacturer, CBP may assess monetary penalties in the maximum amount permitted by law. Further, OEM-supplier dynamics will require consideration as the Proclamation does not require the OEM to automatically allow the supplier to use the import adjustment offset; as a result, the supplier may incur the tariff but is not guaranteed an offset by the OEM, unless otherwise required to do so in the supplier agreement (e.g., a contractual provision requiring the pass through of rebates or credits).

The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of CBP, will develop the necessary rules and guidance for implementing the Proclamation.  An initial issue, which will likely be based on the May 29, 2025 submissions from the OEMs, will be a determination of what vehicles are subject to “final assembly in the United States.”  Similar provisions, such as Treasury’s May 2024 Final Rule  on the Inflation Reduction Act, defined final assembly as the process by which a manufacturer produces a vehicle “at, or through the use of, a plant, factory, or other place from which the vehicle is delivered to a dealer or importer with all component parts necessary for the mechanical operation of the vehicle included with the vehicle, whether or not the component parts are permanently installed in or on the vehicle.”  A similar approach may be used in the Section 232 context.

USMCA Automobile Parts

The Proclamation is silent regarding USMCA-certified automobile parts that are potentially subject to tariffs after May 3, 2025.  As indicated in the Thompson Hine Update of April 3, 2025 , the 25% tariff does not apply “to  automobile parts that qualify for preferential treatment under the USMCA until such time that the Secretary, in consultation with CBP, establishes a process to apply the tariff exclusively to the value of the non-U.S. content of such automobile parts and publishes notice in the Federal Register.”  While the Proclamation does not address whether USMCA-certified auto parts will remain exempt from the 25% tariffs, the White House Fact Sheet provides examples where “a manufacturer builds a car in the U.S. that has 85% U.S. or USMCA content, the manufacturer effectively will not owe tariffs on that vehicle’s production for the first year. If a manufacturer builds a car in the U.S. that is 50% U.S. or USMCA content and 50% imported from elsewhere, then instead of paying the tariff on the full 50% of the imported car parts, the manufacturer effectively only pays on 35% for the first year.”  The implication from these examples is that USMCA automobile parts will remain exempt from the Section 232 25% duties, while non-USMCA automobile parts will use the import adjustments offset to reach duty-free treatment, but guidance/confirmation is needed.

Non-U.S. Passenger Vehicles and Light Trucks and USMCA

For passenger vehicles and light trucks where the automobile producer does not perform final assembly in the United States (i.e., non-U.S. automobiles), Proclamation 10908 subjects such automobiles to 25% tariffs, with special provisions where the automobile is USMCA-certified (i.e., having 75% regional value content, 70% steel and aluminum content, and the requisite labor value content).  If USMCA-certified, Proclamation 10908 provides a process where the automobile manufacturer will provide the Secretary of Commerce with documentation as to the amount of U.S. content, and the 25% percent tariffs will only apply to the non-U.S. content in the automobile.  The OEMs and the Department of Commerce will be conducting this USMCA “domestic content” process parallel to the domestic, final assembly process due on or before May 29, 2025.

Stacking of International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Section 232 Tariffs

Finally, the Trump Administration issued a separate EO (the “stacking EO”) on the same day as the Proclamation indicating that the automobile and automobile parts tariffs will not “stack” with the Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs, and the steel and aluminum tariffs.  The steel and aluminum tariffs will continue to stack with each other, but not with the automotive/auto parts tariffs and the Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs.   See Thompson Hine Update of April 30, 2025.


Conclusions

  1. Non-USMCA, fully assembled passenger vehicles and light trucks imported into the United States are subject to Section 232 25% tariffs (i.e., not assembled at the final stage in the U.S).
    • These automobiles are not subject to the IEEPA Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs, the 25% Section 232 steel or aluminum tariffs nor the 10% baseline reciprocal tariffs.
  1. USMCA-certified passenger vehicles and light trucks that are not assembled at the final stage in the U.S. are subject to 25% tariffs on non-U.S. content once certified by the Secretary of Commerce.
    • These automobiles are not subject to the IEEPA Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs, the 25% Section 232 steel or aluminum tariffs nor the 10% baseline reciprocal tariffs.
  1. Passenger Vehicles and Light Trucks that are final assembled in the U.S. may use the import adjustment offset for in-scope automobile parts.
    • OEMs can claim import adjustment offset amounts equal to 3.75 % in year 1 and 2.5% in year 2 of aggregated MSRP for all of the OEM’s U.S. final assembly. Such amount will be held by CBP to offset any Section 232 automotive parts tariffs.  The Department of Commerce will establish a process by May 29, 2025 in which OEMs can submit the necessary information and obtain approval for the import adjustment offset amounts.
  1. USMCA certified automotive parts used in passenger vehicles and light trucks will likely not be subject to Section 232 automotive 25% tariffs in years 1 and 2, but this has yet to be clearly confirmed.
    • Caution should be warranted regarding USMCA certified automotive parts and the 25% Section 232 steel or aluminum tariffs or the 10% baseline reciprocal tariffs, as it has not yet been clarified how USMCA certification interacts with the “Stacking EO.”  The issue is whether a good subject to duty, but having an exemption such as USMCA and accordingly paying 0% duty, is further exempted from the other “Stacking EO” tariffs.
  1. Non-USMCA certified in-scope automotive parts used in passenger vehicles and light trucks that are not used in automobiles final, assembled in the United States are subject to Section 232 25% tariffs on the full value of the automobile part with no import adjustment offset.
    • Due to the “Stacking EO,” these parts are not subject to additional IEEPA Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs, the 25% Section 232 steel or aluminum tariffs nor the 10% baseline reciprocal tariffs.

President Trump Issues Clarification on Application of Various IEEPA Tariffs

On April 29, 2025, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Order (EO) clarifying that each of the tariffs he has imposed pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, serve separate and distinct policy purposes, but should “not all have a cumulative effect (or ‘stack’ on top of one another)” to the extent that they apply to the same imported article.  Stating that the rate of duty resulting from stacking “exceeds what is necessary to achieve the intended policy goals,” the EO sets out the procedure for determining which tariffs will apply to an article when that article is subject to more than one tariff action.

The EO addresses the following tariffs:

  • the 25% Section 232 tariffs on imports of automobiles and certain auto parts into the United States;
  • the 25% IEEPA tariffs on Canada and Mexico to address the flow of synthetic opioids/fentanyl into the United States;
  • the 25% Section 232 tariffs on imports of steel articles into the United States; and
  • the 25% Section 232 tariffs on imports of aluminum articles into the United States.

The EO states that:

  • Items subject to the Section 232 automobile and auto part tariffs, will not be subject to the other listed tariffs.
  • Items subject to the IEEPA tariffs on Canada or Mexico will not be subject to the Section 232 tariffs on imports of aluminum or steel articles.
  • Items subject to the aluminum or steel tariffs may be subject to both aluminum and steel tariffs if the article satisfies all conditions necessary for application of those additional tariffs.

The action provides relief to companies that faced the potential stacking of the automotive/auto parts tariffs, the Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs, and the steel and aluminum tariffs.  The steel and aluminum tariffs will continue to stack with each other, but not with the automotive/auto parts tariffs and the Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs.  As between these four classes of tariffs, there is an open question as to whether the “subject to tariffs” language in Section 3 of the EO means tariffs as applied prior to any exemption such as the United States Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) exemption provided in the Canada and Mexico synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs.  Specifically, articles of Canada and Mexico are subject to IEEPA tariffs, but are exempt from such tariffs if the articles may be USMCA certified (see Update of March 6, 2025).  As those articles would have a no duty pursuant to IEEPA, the question remain as to whether they would still be subject to duty under the 25% Section 232 automotive/auto parts tariffs or steel or aluminum tariffs, if applicable (see Update of March 12, 2025 (25% Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum) and Update of March 27, 2025 (25% Section 232 tariffs on automotive/auto parts)).  The spirit of the EO suggests that one of the tariffs would be paid by the importer of record—i.e., there is not a blanket exemption via USMCA.  Guidance is required from the relevant agencies.

However, the EO clearly indicates that the synthetic opioid/fentanyl tariffs imposed against articles of China under IEEPA are still subject to stacking.  Additionally, if an imported article is subject to both a tariff action listed above and one not listed, then the different tariffs will continue to be cumulative. However, articles subject to the above tariffs are expressly exempted from the 10% “baseline” reciprocal tariffs (see Update of April 10, 2025).  In addition, an imported article that is subject to tariffs listed above “may still be subject to other applicable duties, taxes, fees, exactions, and charges” such as the Section 301 tariffs imposed against China during the first Trump Administration and continued under President Biden and any antidumping and countervailing duties (see Update of September 16, 2024).  Of key importance, the effect of this EO is retroactive for all entries of articles made on or after March 4, 2025, and importers may request refunds.

It is expected that Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) will be issuing clarifying information and guidance shortly via its Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS).

Dan Ujczo | Senior Counsel | Thompson Hine LLP

U.S. Tariff Update from NASCO Network

Monday, March 3, 2025, 11:07 p.m.

IEEPA Tariffs Against Canada and Mexico to Enter in Force March 4, 2025; IEEPA Tariffs Against China to Increase to 20% (and may be retroactive to February 4); Canada to Immediately Retaliate

The Trump Administration has issued a triad of trade actions designed to advance tariffs against Canada and Mexico and increase tariffs against China effective March 4, 2025, all arising from declared national emergencies at U.S. borders and implemented pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. We will provide ongoing updates, as always, at SmarTrade SmarTrade | Thompson Hine | Timely Updates on International Trade, but here is the latest:

Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (US-CBP) has issued draft Federal Register notices (to be published March 6, 2025) Notice of Implementation of Additional Duties on Products of Canada Pursuant to the President’s Executive Order 14193, Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border 2025-03664.pdf and Notice of Implementation of Additional Duties on Products of Mexico Pursuant to the President’s Executive Order 14194, Imposing Duties to Address the Situation At Our Southern Border 2025-03665.pdf that confirm the implementation of the following IEEPA tariffs effective March 4, 2025:

  1. Ten percent (10%) ad valorem tariffs on energy and energy resources from Canada, defined in the accompanying annex as “crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals, as defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606(a)(3)”,
  2. Twenty five percent (25%) ad valorem tariffs on other products of Canada, and
  3. Twenty five percent (25%) ad valorem tariffs on products of Mexico.

Additionally, the White House issued an Executive Order Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China that increased the current IEEPA duties on all products of China from ten percent (10%) to twenty percent (20%). Further Amendment to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China – The White House While the Trump Administration’s recent statements suggest the increase is to take effect March 4, 2025, the plain language of the Executive Order indicates that the 20% will be retroactive to February 4, 2025.  We anticipate clarification on this issue from the Administration.

All of the relevant IEEPA actions continue to allow for Section 321 de minimis treatment (aka the “$800 dollar” rule) for products of Canada, China and Mexico but such treatment “shall cease to be available for such articles upon notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the President that adequate systems are in place to fully and expediently process and collect tariff revenue” for such goods.

Additionally, the only articles expressly excluded from the ad valorem duties at this time include those listed under IEEPA’s 50 U.S.C. section 1702(b) such as “postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication[s], which do[] not involve a transfer of anything of value”, “donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering”, “informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds” and  “any transactions ordinarily incident to travel to or from any country, including importation of accompanied baggage for personal use.”

HTSUS Chapter 98 “Special Classifications” will continue to apply and potentially exempt certain articles from tariffs EXCEPT updated valuation rules will apply to various goods fabricated in the U.S. and assembled abroad (9802.00.80), metal goods exported for further processing and returned (9802.00.60) and manufactured articles exported for repairs and alterations (9802.00.40-.50).  As many of these “Chapter 98s” have not been regularly used in the duty-free environment of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), companies may want review Chapter 98 to determine potential eligibility.

Companies meanwhile must review the Federal Register notices and accompanying annexes to comply with the customs entry procedures including using the new Chapter 9903.01.01-.03 (products of Mexico) and Chapter 9903.01.10-13 (products of Canada) for the entry of such goods.  As a result, all products of Mexico and Canada (except those expressly excluded by IEEPA as noted above) must be entered under these new HTSUS codes, effective March 4, 2025.  The Annexes further provide:

  1. Country of origin shall be determined using the standards provides in 19 CFR part 102 (as is the customary) and the last place of substantial transformation.
  2. All USMCA originating goods are subject to the IEEPA tariffs.
  3. The IEEPA tariffs are in addition to any other general duties, special duties including antidumping/countervailing duties (AD/CVD), Section 301, Section 232, or other taxes, fees and charges.
  4. All goods entering foreign trade zones (FTZs) on or after 12:01 am EST on March 4, 2025 must enter under “privileged foreign status” unless otherwise eligible to enter under “domestic status.”
  5. Duty Drawback will not be available for the tariffs imposed pursuant to IEEPA.

The Annexes do not provide specific HTSUS codes for energy or energy resources products and apply the definition used in Executive Order 14156 Declaring a National Energy Emergency. HTSUS Chapter 27 products such as crude oil and natural gas fall within the plain language of the definition; however, “refined petroleum products” may be subject to further interpretation.

President Trump will present the State of the Union on March 4, 2025.  While the IEEPA tariffs will be in effect, this speech to the joint session of Congress may reveal the President’s overall plan for tariffs and potentially provide “off ramps.” We also anticipate the launch of public consultations regarding USMCA will occur this week and further guide North American trade.

Mexico and Canada continue to be surprised by the implementation of the tariffs given the significant security progress at the border.  The Prime Minister of Canada has issued a statement indicating that its responsive measures will issue immediately after the IEEPA tariffs enter into effect. Statement by the Prime Minister on unjustified U.S. tariffs against Canada | Prime Minister of Canada The first tranche of retaliatory tariffs of just over CAD 33 billion is available List of products from the United States subject to 25 per cent tariffs effective February 4, 2025 – Canada.ca with the remainder of the CAD 155 billion to follow in twenty-one (21) days (March 25).  Canada previously launched a remission process (i.e., an exclusion process)  in other matters and details will follow. Process for requesting remission of surtaxes that apply on certain goods from China – Canada.ca

Mexico has not formally indicated its planned response and all intelligence is that Mexico is unlikely to retaliate at this time.

Key dates:

March 4, 2025IEEPA Tariffs on Mexico and Canada Enter into Force; Increase in IEEPA China Tariffs
State of the Union
Canada’s Announcement of Retaliation
Potential Launch of USMCA Public Consultations by USTR
March 9, 2025Liberal Party Leadership Elections in Canada
March 11, 2025Close of Public Comments on Reciprocal Tariffs / Non-Tariff Barriers by USTR
March 12, 2025Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Scheduled to Enter into force pursuant to Section 232
March 24, 2025Close of Public Comments re: Section 301 China Maritime, Logistics and Shipbuilding Dominance by USTR
April 1, 2025America First Trade Policy Memorandum Reports Due
April 2, 2025Reciprocal Tariffs

Dan Ujczo | Senior Counsel | Thompson Hine LLP

Sunday, February 1, 2025, 11:49 p.m.

The is an end-of-day (early morning) summary of the tariff actions announced by the United States against imported products of Canada, Mexico, and China, and the potential retaliatory actions by those countries against U.S. exports. 

Beyond the amount of the tariffs and timing, there is no exclusion process for the U.S. tariffs and there are key limitations/restrictions on existing and potential duty mitigation strategies such as duty drawback and foreign trade zone (FTZ) designations.  Moreover, and potentially underreported, is that the U.S. action eliminates Section 321 “de minimis” exemptions (i.e., the $800 rule) for products of China, Canada and Mexico, which has implications for e-commerce retailers, fast fashion and many other North American companies including the warehouse and third-party logistics providers that have large presences in border regions.

We emphasize that this is just the beginning of the America First Trade Policy agenda.  The review of the “new NAFTA”/USMCA is underway, the U.S. has launched analyses of planned sectoral tariffs (e.g., steel, aluminum, semiconductors, copper, oil & gas, pharmaceuticals), and the across-the-board Global Supplemental Tariffs loom, all with target dates in Q1/Q2 2025.

  1. President Trump issued three (3) Executive Orders on February 1, 2025 largely confirming our prior report that the U.S. will impose the tariffs pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) that will take effect on goods entered into the United States that are “products of” Canada, Mexico, or China effective Tuesday, February 4, 2025 as follows:
  • 10% tariff on “products of Canada” that are“energy resources” defined as crude oil, natural gas, lease condensates, natural gas liquids, refined petroleum products, uranium, coal, biofuels, geothermal heat, the kinetic movement of flowing water, and critical minerals (as critical minerals are defined by 30 U.S.C. 1606 (a)(3))”.
  • 25% tariff on all other “products of Canada”.
  • 25% tariff on all “products of Mexico”.
  • 10% tariff on all “products of China”.
  • All of these tariffs are in addition to/cumulative “with any other duties, fees, exactions or charges”.
  • The definitions of “products of Canada” “products of Mexico” and “products of China” will be determined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / U.S. Customs and Border Protection (US-CBP) as to be defined in forthcoming (not yet available) Federal Register Notice(s).  Typically, the rules surrounding country of origin (“COO”), which govern nearly all customs matters, will be used to define “products of”.
  • THERE IS NO EXCLUSION PROCESS AT THIS TIME.
  • For goods that are “products of Canada”, “products of Mexico” and “products of China” and enter Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs), those goods must now only enter as “foreign privileged status”, which “locks in” the tariffs as of the date the goods entered the FTZ as opposed the later date when the goods may be withdrawn/sold (e.g, a later date when the tariffs may be removed), thereby limiting this tariff mitigation technique.
  • No duty drawback “will be available with respect to the duties imposed pursuant to this order” which also eliminates a common tariff mitigation technique.
  • The removal for ALL “products of Canada”, “products of Mexico” and “products of China” the use of de minimis / section 321 treatment which largely exempts certain customs requirements for shipments over USD 800.  This is a significant elimination for e-commerce and parcel shipments and has broad implication for the trade.
  • Limited treatment for goods that are entered for consumption, withdrawn from a warehouse for consumption, loaded on a vessel at the port of loading, or in transit on the final mode of transport between February 1, 2025 and February 4, 2025 to address those goods moving during the “gap” period.
  • The President reserves the right to “increase or expand in scope the duties” should Canada, Mexico, or China retaliate.
  • Any prior Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other Presidential Directive or guidance that is related to trade with Canada, Mexico or China that “is inconsistent” with the new EO is “terminated, suspended or modified to the extent necessary.”  Moreover, the national security exception in international trade matters (and USMCA) likely would be raised as a U.S. defense to any challenge by the three targeted countries.
  • The Secretary of Homeland Security (Kristi Noem), in coordination with Secretary of State (Marco Rubio), the Attorney General (Pam Bondi), Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Michael Waltz), and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security (Stephen Miller), shall inform the President “of any circumstances, that, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security, indicate”: “the Government of Canada has taken adequate steps to alleviate this public health crisis through cooperative enforcement actions”, the “Government of Mexico has taken adequate steps to alleviate the illegal migration and illicit  drug  crisis through cooperative actions”, or “the PRC [People’s Republic of China] Government has taken adequate steps to alleviate the opioid crisis through cooperative actions.” The President then will determine if tariffs should be removed.
  1. The Executive Orders impose the tariffs pursuant to the IEEPA which affords the President with the authority “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”  The President declared a national emergency on January 20, 2025 with the issuance of Proclamation 10886 National Emergency at the Southern Border relating to undocumented migration and illegal drugs.  The three new Executive Orders expand that emergency action and include repeated references to fentanyl, opioids, drugs methamphetamine, cocaine, border security, human trafficking, smuggling, the purported relationship between drug cartels and the Mexican government, and China’s fentanyl traffickers’ purported relationship with the PRC government, the strain on the U.S. public health system and many other emergency issues.

i.      With regard to Canada, the Imposing Duties to Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across our Northern Border Proclamation expands the emergency action “to cover the threat to the safety and security of Americans, including the public health crisis of deaths due to the use of fentanyl and other illicit drugs and the failure of Canada to do more to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept [drug trafficking organizations] other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large, and drugs.” The Proclamation specifically cites: (1) Canada’s “central role” in the sustained influx of opioids and other drugs, (2) Canada’s failing to devote sufficient attention and resources to meaningfully coordinate with United States Law enforcement partners to stem the tide of illicit drugs; (3) human trafficking and smuggling at the northern border, (4) Mexican cartels operating fentanyl and nitazene labs in Canada, (5) the flow of drugs from Canada to the U.S. through illicit networks and mail, including de minimis shipments, and (6) Canada’s Financia Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre information regarding money laundering of illicit proceeds and the expansion of fentanyl production, particularly in British Columbia.  The Proclamation notes the low volumes of fentanyl in Canada as compared to the “southern border” but highlights that even small amounts of fentanyl can kill Americans.

ii.      With regard to Mexico, the Imposing Duties to Address the Situation at Our Southern Border Proclamation expands the emergency action “to cover Mexico’s failure to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept DTOs, other drug and human traffickers, criminals at large and illicit drugs.”

iii.      With regard to the PRC, the Imposing Duties to Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China Proclamation expands the emergency action “to cover the failure of PRC government to arrest, seize, detain, or otherwise intercept chemical precursor suppliers, money launderers, other [transnational criminal organizations], criminals at large, and drugs.”

  1. IEEPA requires the President to consult with Congress “in every possible instance” before taking action pursuant to the statute.  Additionally, the President must perform certain post-imposition actions such as publishing the action in the Federal Register.  The main “check” against IEEPA abuse is Congress, which can issue a joint resolution (required in both the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate) removing the underlying national emergency.  Given the Republican majorities in the U.S. House of Representative and U.S. Senate, and the nexus to the politically sensitive issues of the U.S. southern border, fentanyl and China, it is unlikely that Congress initially will seek to repeal the national emergency unless there are significant economic costs over time and political outcry.
  2. Legal questions may arise regarding the use of IEEPA to impose tariffs.  IEEPA typically is used to impose sanctions and seizures (e.g., terrorism related asset seizures) but there is only one instance of imposing tariffs.  Specifically, President Nixon used IEEPA under a predecessor statute in the early 1970 to impose “surtaxes” (i.e., tariffs) to address currency issues.  It has not been used to impose tariffs since that time.  It is highly likely that there will be legal and/or procedural challenges surrounding the tariff authority under IEEPA and procedural elements such as consultation. These will take time and are unlikely (absent TRO/injunctive relief) to stop the imposition of the tariffs in the near term.
  3. Canada has announced retaliatory tariffs of 25% against $155 billion of U.S. goods, with $30 billion to commence on Tuesday, February 4, 2025 and the remaining $125 billion to be implemented in 21 days’ time.  These will be tailored to specific products in politically important congressional districts (e.g., Republican districts), largely in Ohio, Michigan and Florida among others, including beer, wine, bourbon, fruits and fruit juices, vegetable, perfume, clothing, household appliances, lumber and more.  At this time, non-tariff measures such as restrictions on energy and critical minerals are being considered but not imposed.  Mexico will retaliate with a “carousel” where products are drawn from all sectors and cycle on and off the list at set periods. Mexico also has advised that it may impose non-tariff actions.

We emphasize that today’s tariffs are just the opening bell. The next wave of trade actions include potential oil and gas, steel and aluminum, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and other sectoral tariffs, negotiations and potential withdrawal of the U.S. from USMCA/CUSMA, and the Global Supplemental Tariffs that may range as high as 10%-20%.  Tariff mitigation strategies, including contracting and sourcing, should be designed and deployed as quickly as possible.  We are available to assist.

Dan Ujczo | Senior Counsel | Thompson Hine LLP